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| حملات لایه دوم |
| منبع : Cisco.com |

حملات در لایه دوم عبارتند از:

MAC Attacks / CAM Overflow

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| Catalyst switches use hash to place MAC in CAM table. 63 bits of source (MAC, VLAN, misc) creates a 17-bit hash value. If the value is the same there are 8 columns to place CAM entries, if all 8 are filled the packet is flooded. Dsniff (macof) can generate 480,000 MAC entries on a switch per minute 8000/s\*60. Assuming a perfect hash function, the CAM table will total out at 128,000 (16,000 x 8) 131,052 to be exact. Since hash isn’t perfect it actually takes 70 seconds to fill the CAM table Once table is full, traffic without a CAM entry floods on the VLAN, but NOT existing traffic with an existing CAM entry. |

VLAN Hopping Attacks

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| Dynamic Trunk Protocol (DTP): Automates ISL/802.1Q trunk configuration - Operates between switches - Does not operate on routers  A station can spoof as a switch with ISL or 802.1Q signaling (DTP signaling is usually required as well) The station is then member of all VLANs Requires a trunking favorable setting on the port |

Double Encapsulated 802.1q VLAN Hopping Attack

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| Send double encapsulated 802.1Q frames Switch performs only one level of decapsulation Unidirectional traffic only Works even if trunk ports are set to off |

GARP Attacks

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| An ARP request message should be placed in a frame and broadcast to all computers on the network. Each computer receives the request and examines the IP address. The computer mentioned in the request sends a response; all other computers process and discard the request without sending a response  Gratuitous ARP is used by hosts to “announce” their IP address to the local network and avoid duplicate IP addresses on the network; routers and other network hardware may use cache information gained from gratuitous ARPs. Gratuitous ARP is a broadcast packet (like an ARP request). ARP has no security or ownership of IP or MAC addresses.    \*Host W broadcasts I’m 1.2.3.1 with MAC 12:34:56:78:9A:BC \*(Wait 5 seconds) \*Host W broadcasts I’m 1.2.3.1 with MAC 12:34:56:78:9A:BC  \*When host Y requests the MAC of 1.2.3.1 the real router will reply and communications will work until host W sends a gratuitous ARP again \*Even a static ARP entry for 1.2.3.1 on Y will get overwritten by the Gratuitous ARP on some OSs |

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| More on Arpspoof  • All traffic now flows through machine running dsniff in a half-duplex manner Not quite a sniffer but fairly close • Port security doesn’t help • Static ARP doesn’t help • Note that attack could be generated in the opposite direction by spoofing the destination host when the router sends its ARP request |

Spanning Tree Attacks

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| Spanning Tree • Purpose: To maintain loop-free topologies in a redundant Layer 2 infrastructure • Provides path recovery services |

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| Send BPDU (Bridge protocol data unit) messages from attacker to force spanning tree recalculations  Impact likely to be DoS • Send BPDU messages to become root bridge The hacker then sees frames he shouldn’t  MITM, DoS, etc. all possible  Any attack is very sensitive to the original topology, trunking, PVST, etc.  Requires attacker to be dual homed to two different switches |  |